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Game-Theoretic Approach to Competition Dynamics in Tourism 
Supply Chains  
ABSTRACT 
     This article considers two tourism supply chains (TSCs). Each TSC is assumed to 
consist of three sectors with the following service providers - a theme park operator, 
accommodation providers, and tour operators. Game theory is used to investigate the 
cooperation and competition between these two TSCs, between the three sectors within 
each TSC and between the enterprises within each sector when configuring and 
marketing package holidays. Two research questions are of particular interest: (1) How 
do the tour operators and accommodation providers determine the optimal number of 
tourists they served, and how does the theme park optimize its admission prices? (2) How 
do the factors like supply chain membership, supply chain preference and strategic 
integration affect supply chain members’ decisions, as well as their performances? 
Several important findings are obtained. First, a larger membership in each of the TSC 
sectors strengthens the sector’s overall capacity and intensifies the internal competition, 
thus reducing members’ profits while other sectors benefit from this internal competition. 
Second, decision-makers of the two competing TSCs should adopt appropriate product 
differentiation strategies by carefully positioning their package holiday products in order 
to optimize their performance. Third, the theme park would benefit from integration with 
the accommodation provider. There exists a win-win situation in which the performances 
of both TSCs could be improved, if the integration adequately increases the TSCs’ 
preference. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
     Package holidays or all-inclusive travel has been very popular and is likely to 
maintain its popularity in many countries such as Japan, Ireland, the UK and China 
(Nozawa 1992; Corcoran, Gillmor and Killen 1996; Taylor 1998; Wang, Hsieh and Huan 
2000). According to the European Union's Package Travel Regulations (1992), “package” 
means the pre-arranged combination of at least two of the components (transport, 
accommodation, and other tourist services) when sold or offered for sale at an inclusive 
price and when the service covers a period of more than 24 hours or includes overnight 
accommodation. For example, a package holiday to Hong Kong marketed and operated 
by travel agents and/or tour operators usually consists of overnight accommodation in 
Hong Kong, visits to one of the two theme parks and other tourist attractions, shopping 
and of course the use of transportation services. 
     Different types of tourism components (activities) in package holidays are provided 
by specific agents and enterprises that form a tourism supply chain (TSC). A TSC 
comprises the suppliers of all the goods and services that go into the delivery of the 
tourism products to tourists (Tapper and Font 2007). Among these suppliers, tour 
operators play a principal role as the intermediaries that bring buyers and sellers together, 
package different tourism products/services into a single product, and market the product 
to the targeted tourist segments (Tepelus 2004). 
     Enterprises in a TSC, on the one hand, benefit from providing components of the 
package tours, as a consistent demand for these products/services could be maintained 
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(Aguiló, Alegre and Sard 2003). On the other hand, the performance of one service 
provider in the TSC depends on the performance of the others (Swaminathan, Smith, and 
Sadeh 1998), as each of the TSC enterprises influences tourists’ experiences as well as 
the payoff behavior of all enterprises within the TSC. The interactions (collaboration and 
competition) among the firms within a TSC and between TSCs suggest that tourism 
enterprises are no longer autonomous entities, but rather they are parts of the TSCs. 
(Lambert and Cooper 2000). 
     TSC collaboration and competition issues are challenging not only for practitioners 
but also for academic researchers. Little analytical work has been reported in the 
literature on TSC management although game theory has been widely applied for 
manufacturing supply chain management (SCM) (Zhang 2006). Although it is relatively 
complex to formulate a theoretical model for TSC collaboration and competition related 
to a particular tourism industry, it becomes increasingly important to identify the 
distinctive features of TSCs for efficient and effective tourism supply chain management 
(TSCM). 
     In this paper, we investigate the competition dynamics of two TSCs for package 
holidays. We consider a tourist destination that is dominated by two theme parks. Each 
theme park works closely and exclusively with its business partners; tour operators and 
accommodation providers. As a result, two TSCs are formed at this destination. These 
two TSCs provide package holidays with different theme parks. One TSC focuses on 
package holiday products exclusively with a “fantasy” theme park and the other TSC 
with a “variety” theme park. Tourists only choose one of the two types of package 
holidays. Therefore, they are substitute products for each other. 
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     A TSC is a network where each sector is represented as a node. The three sectors 
are arranged into two layers or echelons. The upstream layer contains the accommodation 
providers and theme park operators. The downstream layer has one sector consisting of 
only tour operators. Tour operators are responsible for configuring and marketing the 
package holidays according to tourists’ requirements from the component options that are 
provided by the upstream sectors. In this paper, travel agents and tour operators are used 
interchangeably. In order to simplify the theoretical model, sectors such as transport, bars 
and restaurants, etc. are not included. Instead, they are implicitly assumed to be within 
the accommodation sector.   
     The purpose of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of competition 
dynamics of the TSC for package holidays. Competition dynamics here is considered as 
the influence and reaction of interdependent and self-interested tourism businesses (e.g. 
theme park operators, accommodation providers, and tour operators) within a TSC in the 
presence of changes in such competition environments as new entrance of competitors, 
changes in supply chain preference, and strategic integration. 
     Several types of competition are discussed. One is the intra-sector competition 
between enterprises within a sector such as the accommodation sector or the sector for 
travel intermediaries. The second is the inter-sector competition in the same layer of a 
TSC. An example is the competition between theme park operators and accommodation 
providers. The third is the cross-sector competition between sectors (and their member 
firms) located in different layers of a TSC. Examples include competition between theme 
parks and tour operators, and between accommodation providers and tour operators. The 
last is the chain competition between two TSCs. It is presented by substitute package 
 
Competition Dynamics of Tourism Supply Chains  6 
tours sold by tour operators in the same market. 
     In this theoretical research, such questions as how many tourists the tour operators 
and accommodation providers should ideally serve, and at what level the theme park 
operators should charge the visitors for admission to the parks, can be answered. 
Furthermore, we are more interested in knowing: (1) how are the market equilibriums 
(price, demand quantity, and the profits of sectors and the TSC) influenced by factors like 
supply chain membership and preference? (2) what is the impact of strategic integration 
in TSC and how does TSC response to such integration? The findings of this research 
should be of interest to decision makers of the service providers within the TSCs, and to 
policy-makers of local governments.  
     This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework in order to address these research 
questions. Simultaneous non-cooperative games are used to analyze the intra-sector and 
the chain competitions, while the leader-follower games are used to investigate the 
cross-sector competition between sectors in different layers of TSCs. The inter-sector 
competition is an indirect competition reflected by two cross-sector competitions. The 
games are static with full information for simplicity. Equilibriums of the multi-stage 
games are solved through backward induction. The intra-sector games are first solved 
before cross-sector games are considered jointly to coordinate the demand (quantity) 
within each TSC. The two TSC games are finally solved for equilibriums for each of the 
individual enterprises, sectors and TSCs.  
     In this research, game theory is chosen for examining the competition dynamics of 
TSC for package holidays for several reasons. First, game theory is a powerful tool for 
analyzing situations in which the decisions of multiple agents affect each agent’s payoff 
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(Cachon and Netessine, 2003). Secondly, the equilibriums of games could allow tourism 
enterprises to predict the actions of their opponents and react with optimal responsive 
strategies. Thirdly, although game theory has been successfully applied in production 
supply chain management (Carr and Karmarkar 2005; Netessine and Shumsky 2005), 
little research has been done in applying game theory to the tourism and hospitality 
industry. Wie (2003) and Garcia and Tugores (2006) represent a few early explorations. 
The findings of this research will make significant theoretical and practical contributions 
to the supply chain management in the tourism and hospitality industry.  
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a review of the literature in 
Section 2, Section 3 presents a game model with three competition types and illustrates 
the equilibrium solution. Section 4 provides the theoretical results of competition 
dynamics. Several management implications are also presented in this section. General 
conclusions and directions for future work are presented in Section 5. All proofs of 
results are given in the Appendix1. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
     Two groups of published studies are relevant to this research. One is the TSC 
specific literature while the other relates to general discussions on game theory and its 
application to supply chain management.  
     The ways in which different businesses in a supply chain compete, coordinate, 
and/or cooperate in providing products and/or services to customers have been widely 
studied. Tourism products, services or experiences involve a wide range of suppliers. 
                                                        
1 The appendix is available through a URL: http://www.digiprise.org/tourism/jbr.htm 
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Page (2003) illustrates a typical TSC for package holidays. Principal elements of a TSC 
include tour operators (or travel agencies), accommodation providers, attractions and 
activities suppliers, etc. He emphasizes that a successful business should be able to 
understand how business conditions can impact upon its business operations, how it 
should respond to the opportunities, threats and shortcomings in the organization, and 
how to manage its relationship with competitors.  
Visiting theme parks is a main motivation and attraction for tourists to choose a 
package holiday. Braun and Soskin (1999) observe substantial changes over time in both 
market structure and overall market environment in the theme park industry in Central 
Florida. They found that the market structure had changed from monopoly to oligopoly. 
Moreover, the prices of theme parks became more stable when the industry continued to 
mature. Wong and Cheung (1999) argue that theme parks could provide unique and 
memorable experiences that differentiate from other types of entertainment. Therefore, 
package holiday products with strategic themes would be more competitive. 
Tour operators play an important role in providing package holidays, as they have a 
direct influence on tourism volume. Based on the econometric analysis of a panel-data set, 
Davies and Downward (1998) conclude that the UK. package tour industry can be best 
characterized as an oligopoly and reject the contestable market hypothesis. Aguiló, 
Alegre, and Sard (2002) analyzed the pricing strategies of the package holiday providers 
in Germany and the UK. and asserted that the tour operator market possesses typical 
oligopolistic features.  
     Accommodation is a fundamental element of any package holiday product 
(Sharpley 2000). Hence, it attracts much attention of researchers. For example, Baum and 
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Mudambi (1995) argue that the Bermuda hotel market is oligopolistic and prices of the 
hotels are well-behaved when excessive supply of hotel accommodation exists. Chung 
(2000) found that the deluxe hotel market in Seoul is a continuum of an oligopoly 
suggesting that the hotel market competition is interdependence. 
     The success of tourism enterprises in a TSC often depends on their mutual 
collaborations as they tend to provide complementary or substitute products/services. For 
example, a theme park needs to coordinate with tour operators, hotels, transportation 
providers, and other tourism facilities in order to increase its visitor volume. Tourists’ 
experiences depend on the quality of all these services (Kemperman 2000). Moreover, 
accommodation providers offer a product of strategic interest to tour operators as it 
determines to a great extent the cost of a package holiday (Medina-Munoz, 
Medina-Munoz, and Garca-Falcon 2003). Therefore, tour operators usually exercise some 
control over the accommodation providers with whom they deal (Bastakis, Buhalis, and 
Butler 2004; Medina-Munoz, Medina-Munoz, and Garca-Falcon 2003). In extreme cases, 
enterprises attempt to achieve more flexible and stable coordination by directly 
integrating suppliers that provide complementary services. For example, a few large tour 
operators in Europe are the result of vertical integration, as they operate their own travel 
agencies, provide chartered flights and run their own hotels (Theuvsen, 2004). These 
tourism businesses are inter-related and form complex TSCs. The goal of the TSC 
management is to achieve a total business success through managing these inter-related 
businesses (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). 
     Game theory has been widely used in SCM research. A variety of game models 
have been proposed according to different supply chain structures. The simplest supply 
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chain has a serial structure and contains two enterprises. This structure is popular with 
different game models for theoretical analysis. For example, the Nash Games (Huang and 
Li 2001), Stackelberg Games (Ertek and Griffin 2002), and Bargaining Games (Sucky 
2005) are based on such supply chains. Supply chains with more complex structures may 
involve multi-stage games. For example, in the two-echelon supply chain with a tree 
structure, Tsay and Agrawal (2000) characterize the competition within an echelon by a 
Nash (simultaneous non-cooperative) Game and the competition between echelons by a 
Stackelberg (leader-follower) Game. Using the same approach between echelons, Yang 
and Zhou (2006) compare three scenarios in which two homogeneous enterprises play the 
Nash Game, the Stackelberg Game, and cooperated, respectively, within the downstream 
echelon. 
     The literature on game theory in tourism and hospitality research has been very 
limited. Using the game-theoretic approach, Aguiló, Alegre and Sard (2002) examine an 
oligopoly tourism market, and conclude that the tour operators tend to have market power 
and are able to charge higher prices for their products without losing the market shares 
that they occupy. Candela and Cellini (2003) argue that a differentiated oligopoly model 
is more appropriate for studying tourism development strategies. Taylor (1998) develops 
a model with a view to analyzing the pricing strategy behavior in the UK package tour 
industry. Wie (2005) builds an N-person non-zero-sum non-cooperative dynamic game to 
investigate the strategic capacity investment in the cruise industry. García and Tugores 
(2006) apply a vertical differentiation duopoly model to explain the reasons why the high 
quality and low quality hotels could co-exist. These research efforts generally focus on 
the behavior of individual tourism enterprises or sectors, rather than in the TSC context 
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(Tapper and Font 2007).  
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
     The tourism system considered here consists of two competitive TSCs. Each 
includes multiple tour operators (TOs), multiple accommodation providers (HAs), and 
one theme park operator (TP). TOs and HAs in the same TSC are grouped into sectors, 
and all entities within a sector are assumed to be identical. The TSC is represented as a 
network where each sector is represented as a node (see Figure 1). The three sectors are 
arranged into two layers or echelons. TP and HAs in the upstream layer are suppliers of 
package tour components or options of package holiday products. TOs in the downstream 
layer are responsible for the configuration and promotion of the package holidays 
according to tourists’ demand for the services provided by the upstream sectors. The 
prices charged by TOs include the payments to the TP and HAs. The two substitutive 
TSCs provide package holidays with two different TPs. Tourists are assumed to choose 
only one of the two package holidays. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider the 
situation where all tourists join the TP through the package holidays. Therefore, those 
tourists who buy admission tickets directly from the TP are not included in our model.  
     Several relationships can be defined in the game. One is the intra-sector 
competition between enterprises within a sector. It is illustrated by the quantity 
competition in the TO and HA sectors. The second type of relationship is the cross-sector 
competition which is between sectors in different layers, e.g. between the TP and TO 
sectors, and between the HA and TO sectors. The cross-sector competition takes the form 
of coordination in the sense that sectors coordinate the demands. The third type is the 
inter-sector competition between sectors in the same layer, e.g. between the TP and HA 
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sectors at the level below the TO sector. The fourth type is the chain competition between 
the two TSCs. They supply substitute package tours and therefore directly compete with 
each other on the target market.  
     A normal game consists of three components: (1) players, (2) strategies available to 
each player, and (3) payoffs received by each player (Cachon and Netessine 2003). In our 
model, all the entities (TPs, TOs, and HAs) in the TSCs are game players, and profits are 
their payoffs. There are two models of determining players’ strategies. One model is that 
the TP takes admission quantity as its strategy, while the TOs and HAs adopt prices as 
their strategies. This model is useful in studying the market dynamics of price-sensitive 
package holidays. The other model is that the TP takes admission price as its strategy, 
while the TOs and HAs adopt quantity as their strategy. This latter model is useful in 
studying the pricing dynamics of the TP over market demand. While the former model 
will be studied in the future,this study is focused on the latter model. This study is 
particularly relevant when TOs and HAs contract and distribute their capacities to their 
service consumers (Lee and Ng, 2001). For example, the tour operator, such as Airtours, 
quantities are determined one season ahead through long-term contracts. Also, it is not 
unusual for Hong Kong hotels to set aside some of their rooms for tour operators one 
month in advance (Choi and Cho, 2000).  
Competitions in the market are described in the following multi-stage game. In the 
first stage, the TP determines the admission price, and the HA sector achieves its market 
clearing prices through quantity competition among HAs. In the second stage, each TO 
receives the prices of the TP and HA and determines the number of tourists they plan to 
serve, then allows the market to determine the final price of the package holiday. 
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Insert Figure 1 here.  
     In the formulation,  and  represent the two TSCs, respectively. 
Subscripts A and B are omitted when a single chain is discussed, and subscript -1 
represents the rival (competing) TSC. There are N TOs and M HAs in a TSC, indexed by 
 and . Variable unit costs of TP, HA, and TO are c,  and , 
respectively. We assume a linear inverse price function for  as 
ATSC BTSC
1...s = N M
1
1...t = 2c 1c
iTO
1
sp Q Qα μ −= − −                                                 (1) 
where 1
sp  is the price of a package holiday product,  and Q 1Q−  are the total tourists 
in the two TSCs. The decision variable is tourist quantity sq  for sTO . Here, α  
represents the market reservation price or the market size (Carr and Karmarkar, 2005). 
Parameter μ  captures the cross-quantity sensitivity or supply chain preference of 
tourists. Supply chain preference measures the willingness of tourists to substitute their 
choice of package holiday products from one TSC to the other. This concept is associated 
with product differentiation, i.e. the difference between the two tourism products. It is 
plausible to assume that μ  increases while the supply chain preference decreases. We 
limit our attention to 0 1μ<
1
≤ , which means that the two TSCs are substitutes of each 
other. Specifically, ifμ = , the two package holidays are perfect substitutes. Note that we 
assume homogeneity among the service providers (TOs or HAs) within a sector. One 
reason for this assumption is to control the model complexity that over-shadows the 
research focus. More importantly, the theme park is often a major differentiation factor 
between package holidays as compared with the hotel. The overall inter-chain 
differentiation better reflects the tourist’s choice behavior between the two package 
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holiday products provided by the two TSCs. 
     Price is a fundamental element of economic theory and the law of tourism demand 
(Crouch 1996). The linear inverse price function is selected here for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the linear form of demand function has been broadly used in 
game-theoretic research in the manufacture supply chain (Carr and Karmarkar 2005; 
Xiao and Yu 2006), as well as in tourism and hospitality literatures (Zheng 1997; Wie 
2005), mainly for its analytical simplicity. Secondly, the relationship between price and 
quantity demand in most of the tourism literatures has been identified to be log linear 
(exponential) (Song and Witt 2000, 2006; Garín-Munoz 2006). This paper focuses on the 
TSC dynamics, especially the impact of systemic parameter changes on the demand for 
tourism, and a linear function would be appropriate to depict exponential function when 
the parameters change slightly within small ranges. Thirdly, the sensitivity of tourists’ 
quantity in the TSC to changes in price is normalized to “1” in the model, as in Ingene and 
Parry (1995). 
     Backward induction is used to solve this multi-stage game. The last stage of the 
game is to allow the TOs to decide the quantities of tourists simultaneously in a 
competitive environment. Given the prices p  and 2p  for TP and HA, respectively, the 
profit function for sTO  is: 
1 1 1 2 1(
s s sq p p p cπ = − − − )                                            (2) 
Taking the first-order condition with respect to quantity, and then summing up the 
equations for all TOs in the TSC, the total demand for the package holiday is measured 
by the total number of tourists as: 
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1 2(
1
N c p p QQ
N
1)α μ −− − − −= +                                       (3) 
The profit functions for  and the TP are tHA 2 2 2( )
t
2
t tp c qπ = −  and 3 ( )Q p cπ = − , 
respectively. Solving 2p  and p  from (3), then substituting the results into the profit 
functions of  and the TP, we can find optimal quantities for  and the TP, 
respectively. Combining these optimal quantities, we get the total number of tourists of 
the TSC as below:  
tHA tHA
1 2 1(
( 1)(2 1)
NM c c c QQ
N M
)α μ −− − − −= + +                                      (4) 
     Equation (4) is the best response function of a TSC with regard to its rival TSC. 
Solving (4) for both TSCs, we have the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the total 
tourist numbers for the two competing TSCs as follows: 
2
( ) (
1
i i i i i i j j j j
i
i i j j
m n C m n m n C
Q
m n m n
)α μ α
μ
− − −= −                               (5) 
where 1[ ,1)
1 2
i
i
i
Nn
N
= ∈+ ,
1 1[ , )
2 1 3 2
i
i
i
Mm
M
= ∈+ , and 1 2i i iC c c ci= + + , .  , ,i j A B=
From (5), we have  if 0AQ < B Bm nδ μ<  where A
B B
C
C
Aαδ α
−= − . That is,  has 
to withdraw from the market if its product loses market attraction due to cost 
disadvantage(s), and  will dominate the package holiday market as a monopoly.  
ATSC
BTSC
To simplify the discussion throughout the article, we additionally assume that 
1
B B
A A
m n
m n
δ μμ > >  to ensure that the demand for each TSC at its equilibrium quantity 
is positive. More equilibrium results are summarized in Table 1. 
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Insert Table 1 here.  
 Equation (5) clearly shows that the equilibrium quantity of  is an increasing 
function of its market size 
iTSC
iα  and the rival TSC’s unit cost , but a decreasing 
function of the rival TSC’s market size 
jC
jα  and its unit cost . The profits of TO, HA, 
and TP are influenced by the market sizes and unit costs in the same way as the quantity, 
because these profits are all proportional to the square of the quantity (see Table 1) 
iC
4. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
     A TSC is a dynamic system. Its performance is determined not only by system 
parameters or variables such as supply chain membership and supply chain preference, 
but also by the supply chain structure and decision principle. This section presents several 
main results from the theoretical analysis. 
Impact of Tourism Supply Chain Membership 
     The number of members in a TSC determines its capability and the intensity of the 
competition. This is illustrated by the following proposition. 
PROPOSTION 1. (1) An increase in the membership in one sector of the TSC benefits 
the profits of enterprises in other sectors of the same TSC, but adversely affects the 
profits of enterprises in the corresponding sector and enterprises in its rival TSC. (2) Such 
an increase also leads to an increase in the total surplus of the TSC but a decrease in the 
total surplus of the corresponding sectors. (3) Such an increase leads to a decrease in 
prices of package holidays of both TSCs. 
     Increased competition is reflected in an increased number of tourism enterprises 
(Banker, Khosla, and Sinha 1998). Proposition 1 has three implications. Firstly, from the 
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TP’s perspective, attracting more TOs and HAs to join the TSC could gain a higher 
market share and profits. Secondly, increased competition within a sector reduces the 
prices of the package holidays and thus increases tourists’ welfare. Thirdly, a sector’s 
surplus will be maximized if the sector is dominated by a single firm (monopoly). An 
example in Table 1 is developed to give the intuitive illustration of our findings. The 
figures in the table are percentage changes compared with the benchmarks listed in Table 
1. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
     In this example, we are more interested in the impact of membership on the types 
of competitors. In our model, the competitors are divided into two different types: direct 
and indirect ones. The direct competitors refer to the members in the same sector of the 
same TSC, while the indirect competitors are the members in the corresponding sector of 
the competing TSC. According to Proposition 1, new entrances in a specific TSC 
decreases the profits of incumbent firms in the corresponding sector of the competing 
TSC, while the entrance of new firms in the competing TSC also result in its profit 
decrease. From Table 1, we observe that the influence of a new direct competitor on the 
sector’s performance is greater than that of a new indirect competitor in a given sector. 
Another important observation is that the negative influence of the entrance of direct 
competitors on the profits of the TSC members would also increase along with the 
decrease inμ . That is, the supply chain preference or the quantity-sensitivity could serve 
as a buffer to reduce the intensity of the competition. 
Impact of tourism supply chain preference 
     As defined previously, supply chain preference measures the willingness of tourists 
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to substitute one product from a TSC with that from another TSC. The preference is 
mostly determined by the product differentiation between the two theme parks, as the 
theme parks are the main motivation and attraction for tourists to choose package 
holidays. The supply chain has a higher preference if the level of it’s μ  in our model is 
lower. Because of symmetry, we only concentrate on one TSC, for example, . The 
following proposition gives the impact of supply chain preference on the system 
equilibriums: 
ATSC
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the TSC preference increases,  
(1) If 1 (
2 B B A A
m n
m n
δ μ μ< +
1 ) , the quantities, prices, and profits of all members in  
increase. (2) The opposite is true if
ATSC
1 1( )
2 B B A A
m n
m n
δ μ μ> + . 
     Proposition 6 shows that an increasing supply chain preference does not 
necessarily improve the performance of the TSC. The following analysis further explains 
the two opposite scenarios. 
     Porter (1980) states that two generic alternative strategies could be adopted to 
expand a firm’s market share. The first strategy is product differentiation. The purpose of 
this strategy is to create something that is perceived as being unique, and provide 
insulation against rivalries. In our model, the supply chain preference (negativeμ ) is 
associated with product differentiation. If a TSC provides a unique experience (product) 
for tourists, the tourists would not easily substitute this product/experience with that from 
other TSCs. Therefore, implementing a product differentiation strategy within a TSC 
indicates an increase in the TSC preference in our model.  
     The second generic strategy is to achieve overall cost leadership through 
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technological innovation and economies of scale (Porter, 1998). In our model, the ratio 
A
B B
C
C
Aαδ α
−= −  captures the relative levels of both cost and market size between the two 
TSCs. A larger value of δ  implies  has lower supply chain costs when the two 
TSCs’ market sizes are the same, and vice versa. Evidently, it would be more profitable 
for  to adopt the cost leadership strategy against its rivals.  
ATSC
ATSC
     Since the two generic strategies are alternative strategies, a business should adopt 
one or the other in order to achieve a superior performance against its competitors. 
(Amoako-Gyampah and Acquaah, 2007).  
     Under the condition of 1 (
2 B B A A
m n
m n
δ μ μ< +
1 ) , the overall performance of 
 increases along with the decrease in ATSC μ . This tendency implies the differentiation 
strategy is feasible to . Meanwhile, the small value of ATSC δ  indicates  does 
not have cost or market size advantage. The best strategy for  is therefore to adopt 
the differentiation strategy. Not only does tourism product differentiation increase (unit) 
profit, but it also avoids the need for a low cost position. Notice that a continuous 
decrease in 
ATSC
ATSC
μ  does not necessarily change this unequal relationship (see appendix).This 
indicates that the differentiation strategy is effective in the long run. 
     Under the condition 1 1 ) ATSC(2 B B A A
m n
m n
δ μ μ> + ,  could not improve its 
performance by product differentiation (decreasing μ ). The differentiation strategy is 
not profitable and should not be adopted. However, the cost advantage or market size 
advantage could motivate  to practice a cost leadership strategy in the long run. A ATSC
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low-cost position places  in a favorable position vis-a-vis substitutes relative to its 
rival (Porter 1998).  
ATSC
12
Impact of tourism supply chain integration 
Operations of tourism supply chain members can be strategically integrated and 
managed as a single entity or system. This section discusses two types of integration in 
TSCs (see figure 2). One is cross-sector integration, in which a tour operator integrates 
with an accommodation provider. The other is inter-sector integration, in which the theme 
park integrates with an accommodation provider. In order to simplify the analysis and 
provide useful managerial implications, we assume that there is only one tour operator 
and one accommodation provider in each TSC.  
Insert Figure 2 here. 
If the tour operator integrates with the accommodation provider, the profit of the 
integrated tour operator is 1 2 1(Q p p c c )π = − − − . From (1) and this profit function, the 
optimal quantity of package holidays is 1 2
2
Q p c c1Q α μ −− − − −=
Q
, which is also the 
demand curve for the theme park. Substituting  into the profit function of the theme 
park, it is easy to calculate the optimal quantity of tourists as 1
4
C QQ α μ −− −= . If the 
rival TSC is not integrated, its response function is (4). Otherwise if the rival TSC is 
cross-sector integrated, it has the same form of response function 1 11 4
C QQ α μ− −− − −= . 
Combining the two response functions for each TSC, we can obtain the equilibrium 
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quantities for the two TSCs, as well as the profits of TSC members2. Proposition 3 shows 
the main conclusions of the impact of cross-sector integration on the profits of the service 
providers in the TSCs. 
PROPOSITION 3: The total profit of the tour operator and the accommodation provider 
decreases after cross-sector integration. Cross-sector integration decreases the rival TSC 
members’ profits but increases the TSC’s volume, as well as the profits of the theme park 
and the supply chain as a whole. 
 Proposition 3 shows that cross-sector integration could improve the TSC’s market 
share irrespective of whether the rival TSC is integrated or not. After the integration, the 
tour provider can serve more tourists with a lower price of the package holiday, thus 
increasing the consumer surplus. But the input price of the theme park also increases due 
to the absence of inter-sector competition. Despite achieving a lower price of 
accommodation service and a larger volume, the tour operator‘s marginal profit reduces 
and profit drops. Without inter-sector competition and having a dominant position in the 
chain, the theme park benefits from the cross-sector integration. Notice that cross-sector 
integration changes the TSC structure. In this situation, the tour operator has no incentive 
to integrate with the accommodation providers. But there are still other factors that could 
influence the integration decision of the tour operator. Such factors include high priority 
access to services, increased market share, and an enhanced long-run competitive 
advantage, etc. The influences of these factors on the tour operator’s willingness to 
integrate with other service providers are possible topics for further research. 
 Another type of inter-sector integration is that the theme park integrates with the 
                                                        
2 The results are illustrated in the Proof of Proposition 3. 
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accommodation provider. The tour operator buys both the accommodation and park 
services from the theme park and changes 23p . The decision process of the tour operator 
does not change and the optimal quantity is 23 1 1
2
p c QQ α − μ −− −= . For the integrated 
theme park, the demand curve is 23 1 1 2p Q c Qα μ −= − − −  and the profit function is 
23 23 2(Q p c c )π = − − . Thus, the optimal tourist quantity is 14
C QQ α μ −− −= . The best 
response functions of the rival TSC are (4) if it is not integrated or 1 11 4
C QQ α μ− −− − −=  
if it is integrated, respectively. Therefore, the equilibrium quantities are derived by jointly 
solving the response functions of the two TSCs3. Proposition 4 presents the main 
conclusions about inter-sector integration. 
PROPOSITION 4: All sectors (i.e. the theme park, the accommodation provider and 
tour operators) benefit from the inter-sector integration between the theme park and the 
accommodation provider. The volume of the integrated TSC increases. The rival TSC 
members’ profits decrease. 
 This proposition suggests that inter-sector integration is the optimal strategy for the 
theme park if the rival TSC does not integrate. On the other hand, if the rival TSC is also 
inter-sector integrated, the inter-sector integration is still the best response strategy for the 
TSC. The tour operator benefits from the lower theme park price and large tourist volume 
after the inter-sector integration. Moreover, the theme park consolidates its dominant 
position by offering a more attractive price.  
Proposition 4 can be used to explain the recent developments in the Hong Kong 
                                                        
3 The results are illustrated in the Proof of Proposition 4. 
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theme park industry. Before 2005, the theme park industry in Hong Kong was dominated 
by the Ocean Park. However, the entry of Disneyland Hong Kong has changed the market 
structure from monopoly to duopoly. Different from Ocean Park, Disneyland Hong Kong 
has two hotels: the Disneyland Hotel and the Hollywood Hotel. Ocean Park has recently 
announced a redevelopment master plan to redevelop the park in order to effectively 
compete with Disneyland Hong Kong. Investment of three themed hotels is an important 
part of the HK$5.5 billion plan. It is hoped that this investment will attract more overseas 
tourists to Ocean Park.  
 Proposition 4 implies that both theme parks in the TSCs would like to be integrated 
with the accommodation providers. But inter-sector integration does not guarantee the 
increase of the total profit for the theme park and the tour operator when compared with 
the scenario in which both TSCs are not integrated. Table 3 illustrates three possible 
outcomes: the total profits of TP and HA increases in both TSCs (Case 1), the profits of 
integrated TP increase in one TSC and decrease in the other (Case 2), and the profits of 
the integrated TP decrease in both TSCs (case 3). In particular, Case 3 is more interesting 
because the optimization of each TSC results in worsened performances of both TSCs. 
Insert Table 3 here. 
     The above analysis has assumed that the inter-sector integration does not affect the 
TSC preference. However, the hotel operated by the theme park is often elaborately 
designed with the same or similar themes as the park. It offers a differentiated experience 
for tourists besides visiting the park, and therefore enhances visitors’ recreational 
experience. As a result, inter-sector integration not only changes the TSC structure, but 
also differentiates the package holidays supplied by the two TSCs. In our model, the 
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differentiation reflects the increase of TSC preference. Under this condition, it is found 
that inter-sector integration improves the tourists’ volume as well as TSC members’ 
profits4. If the package holiday products are adequately differentiated through integration, 
the performance of the rival TSC would not necessarily be adversely affected by the 
inter-sector integration. This is somewhat different from the finding obtained from 
Proposition 4. For example, if 0.6μ = , 10A ACα − = , and 12B BCα − = , the tourists 
quantity of  is 1.48 when both TSCs are not inter-sector integrated. If  is 
inter-sector integrated and
ATSC BTSC
μ  changes to 0.5, the quantity of  would decrease to 
1.43. If inter-sector integration changes 
ATSC
μ  to 0.3 (implying a larger differentiation), the 
quantity of  would increases to 1.52. It is clear that the inter-sector integration of 
 with an increased product differentiation would improve the performances of both 
TSCs. In summary, if both TSCs adequately differentiate their products through 
inter-sector integration, they would achieve a win-win outcome. 
ATSC
BTSC
5. CONCLUSION 
     This paper formulates a multi-stage game framework for studying the collaboration 
and competition dynamics in TSCs for package holidays. Three sectors are considered. 
They are tour operators, accommodation providers, and theme park operators. Four types 
of relationships are analyzed theoretically. They are the intra-sector competition between 
suppliers within a sector, the inter-sector competition between sectors in a certain supply 
chain, cross-sector coordination between sectors in different layers, and the chain 
                                                        
4 The proof can be found in the Appendix. 
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competition between two TSCs. Backwards induction is proposed to solve this game. The 
theme park sector and the accommodation sector make their moves first to determine the 
theme park admission price and the accommodation market clears its price through 
quantity competition,. In the second stage, each tour operator receives the prices of the 
theme parks and accommodation providers and determines the number of tourists they 
plan to serve. Finally the prices of the package holidays are determined by the market. 
     Based on the equilibrium results, the impacts of the two system parameters (i.e. 
supply chain membership and supply chain preference) and strategic integrations are 
studied. Several managerial implications can be derived from this study. Firstly, more 
members in a TSC strengthen its overall capacity. However, increased competition due to 
increased TSC membership in a sector reduces the profit for each service provider as well 
as the sector profit, while the service providers from other sectors benefit from the 
increased competition within this sector. Secondly, the increasing supply chain preference 
does not necessarily improve the performance of a TSC. When a TSC does not have cost 
or market size advantage as compared to its rival, this TSC should consider the product 
differentiation strategy in the long run. However, a cost leadership strategy would be the 
optimal choice for supply chains. Thirdly, it is unprofitable for tour operators to integrate 
with the accommodation providers. However, the theme park has incentive to integrate 
with the accommodation providers. If the theme parks can effectively differentiate 
themselves from their competitors through strategic integration with the accommodation 
providers, both TSCs would benefit. 
     The current research can be extended further in several directions. Firstly, the 
model could be directly related to multiple sectors, not only the tour operators, 
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accommodation providers, and theme park operators, but also transportation, restaurants 
and retail shops, etc. The government could also be recognized as a player who has an 
interest in societal welfare or overall economic profit in the analytical framework. 
Secondly, in this paper, the price and quantity are the only two decision variables for 
tourism enterprises. However, others factors such as the service quality and advertising 
may also influence the performance of TSCs. Multiple dimensions of the enterprise 
decision model in the context of a TSC could be discussed in further research. Thirdly, 
the analyses could be undertaken under different coordination schemes. For example, 
there could be a dominant tour operator and a follower, or some tour operators vertically 
integrating with the accommodation providers. 
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Figure 1 Two competing tourism supply chains in a tourist destination 
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Figure 2 Cross-sector integration and inter-sector integration in a TSC 
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Table 1  Sub-game perfect Nash equilibriums of  iTSC
 Quantity Price Profit 
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Table 2  Influence of a new entrant 
1μ =  0.75μ =  Profit 
( ) ATSC 1AN +  1BN +  1AM + 1BM + 1AN +  1BN +  1AM +  1BM +  
TO -15.68 -0.87 2.71 -1.32 -15.82 -0.61 2.48 -0.94 
TO sector -7.25 -0.87 2.71 -1.32 -7.40 -0.61 2.48 -0.94 
HA 1.18 -0.87 -24.54 -1.32 1.01 -0.61 -24.71 -0.94 
HA sector 1.18 -0.87 -11.97 -1.32 1.01 -0.61 -12.16 -0.94 
TP 1.18 -0.87 2.71 -1.32 1.01 -0.61 2.48 -0.94 
TSC 0.57 -0.87 0.76 -1.32 0.40 -0.61 0.54 -0.94 
0.5μ =  0.25μ =  Profit 
( ) ATSC 1AN +  1BN +  1AM + 1BM + 1AN +  1BN +  1AM +  1BM +  
TO -15.91 -0.40 2.34 -0.60 -15.96 -0.20 2.26 -0.30 
TO sector -7.50 -0.40 2.34 -0.60 -7.55 -0.20 2.26 -0.30 
HA 0.91 -0.40 -24.81 -0.60 0.85 -0.20 -24.87 -0.30 
HA sector 0.91 -0.40 -12.28 -0.60 0.85 -0.20 -12.35 -0.30 
TP 0.91 -0.40 2.34 -0.60 0.85 -0.20 2.26 -0.30 
TSC 0.30 -0.40 0.40 -0.60 0.24 -0.20 0.32 -0.30 
(Benchmark data: ,10AN = 6AM 1000A AC = 9BN,
 
= ,α − = , 5BM = , 950B BC− = ) α
Table 3  Total profits of the theme park and the tour operator 
before and after integration 
Total profit of TP and 
HA before integration Profit of integrated TP Case μ  A ACα −  B BCα −  
ATSC  BTSC  ATSC  BTSC  
1 0.5 10 12 0.91 1.41 0.93 1.50 
2 1 10 18 0.58 3.14 0.43 3.42 
3 1 10 10 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.80 
 
